From 76692869d7b1366efe9ce5cc9748525000931b56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: zzz <zzz@mail.i2p>
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 13:51:25 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] prop 148 minor update
---
i2p2www/spec/proposals/148-eddsa-blake2b-ed25519.rst | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/i2p2www/spec/proposals/148-eddsa-blake2b-ed25519.rst b/i2p2www/spec/proposals/148-eddsa-blake2b-ed25519.rst
index 8763e19d9..4d56cfd83 100644
--- a/i2p2www/spec/proposals/148-eddsa-blake2b-ed25519.rst
+++ b/i2p2www/spec/proposals/148-eddsa-blake2b-ed25519.rst
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ EdDSA-BLAKE2b-Ed25519
:author: zzz
:created: 2019-03-12
:thread: http://zzz.i2p/topics/2689
- :lastupdated: 2019-03-20
+ :lastupdated: 2019-03-21
:status: Open
.. contents::
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Motivation
During discussions and design of NTCP2 (proposal 111) and LS2 (proposal 123),
we briefly considered various attacks that were possible, and how to
prevent them. Three of these attacks are Length Extension Attacks,
-Reuse of Signed Data, and Duplicate Message Identification.
+Cross-Protocol Attacks, and Duplicate Message Identification.
For both NTCP2 and LS2, we decided that
these attacks were not directly relevant to the proposals at hand,
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ where the hash is signed.
For other signed datagram sig types, the data is signed.
-Reuse of Signed Data
---------------------
+Cross-Protocol Attacks
+----------------------
Signed data in I2P protocols may be vulnerable to
-a Reuse of Signed Data (RSD) due to lack Of domain separation.
+Cross-Protocol Attacks (CPA) due to lack of domain separation.
This allows an attacker to use data received in one context
(such as a signed datagram) and present it as valid, signed data
in another context (such as streaming or network database).
--
GitLab