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+=============================
+Authenticated Address Helpers
+=============================
+.. meta::
+    :author: zzz
+    :created: 2017-02-25
+    :thread: http://zzz.i2p/topics/2241
+    :lastupdated: 2017-02-25
+    :status: Open
+
+.. contents::
+
+
+Overview
+========
+
+This proposal adds an authentication mechanism to address helper URLs.
+
+
+Motivation
+==========
+
+Address helper URLs are inherently insecure. Anybody may put an address helper 
+parameter in a link, even for an image, and may put any destination in the 
+"i2paddresshelper" URL parameter. Depending on the user's HTTP proxy 
+implementation, this hostname/destination mapping, if not currently in the 
+addressbook, may be accepted, either with or without an interstitial for the 
+user to accept.
+
+
+Design
+======
+
+Trusted jump servers and addressbook registration services would provide new 
+address helper links that add authentication parameters. The two new parameters 
+would be a base 64 signature and a signed-by string.
+
+These services would generate and provide a public key certificate. This 
+certificate would be available for download and inclusion in http proxy 
+software. Users and software developers would decide whether to trust such 
+services by including the certificate.
+
+On encountering an address helper link, the http proxy would check for the 
+additional authentication parameters, and attempt to verify the signature. On 
+successful verification, the proxy wold proceed as before, either by accepting 
+the new entry or showing an interstitial to the user. On verification failure, 
+the proxy could reject the address helper or show additional information to the 
+user.
+
+If no authentication parameters are present, the http proxy may accept, 
+decline, or present information to the user.
+
+Jump services would be trusted as usual, but with the additional authentication 
+step. Address helper links on other sites would need to be modified.
+
+
+
+Security Implications
+=====================
+
+This proposal adds security by adding authentication from trusted registration 
+/ jump services. 
+
+
+
+Specification
+=============
+
+TBD.
+
+The two new parameters could be i2paddresshelpersig and i2paddresshelpersigner?
+
+Accepted signature types TBD. Probably not RSA as the base 64 signatures would 
+be very long.
+
+Signature algorithm: TBD. Maybe just hostname=b64dest (same as proposal 112 for 
+registration authentication)
+
+Possible third new parameter: The registration authentication string (the part 
+after the "#!") to be used for additional verification by the HTTP proxy. Any 
+"#" in the string would have to be escaped as "#" or "#", or be 
+replaced by some other specified (TBD) URL-safe character.
+
+
+Migration
+=========
+
+Old HTTP proxies that don't support the new authentication parameters would 
+ignore them, and pass them along to the web server, which should be harmless.
+
+New HTTP proxies that optionally support authentication parameters would work 
+fine with old address helper links that don't contain them.
+
+New HTTP proxies that require authentication parameters would not allow old 
+address helper links that don't contain them.
+
+A proxy implementation's policies may evolve over the course of a migration 
+period.
+
+Issues
+======
+
+A site owner could not generate an address helper for his own site, as it needs 
+the signature from a trusted jump server. He would have to register it on the 
+trusted server and get the authenticated helper  URL from that server. Is there 
+a way for a site to generate a self-authenticated address helper URL?
+
+Alternatively, the proxy could check the Referer for  an address helper 
+request. If the Referer were present, contained a b32, and the b32 matched the 
+helper's destination, then it could be allowed as a self-referral. Otherwise it 
+could be assumed to be a 3rd-party request, and rejected.
+